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I. INTRODUCTION
A dispute over a group of small, uninhabited, seemingly insignificant
islands in the East China Sea has sparked dangerous international discord in
recent years.1 Known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, this
cluster of islands (the Islands) is located “roughly 120 nautical miles
northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles east of mainland China, and 240
nautical miles southwest of Japanese Okinawa.”2 Japan and China bitterly
contest sovereignty over the islands, and the dispute has sparked popular
nationalist fervor on both sides.3 This mutually virulent animosity has
manifested itself over the past several years in a series of headline-grabbing
events: (1) the Japanese government’s decision, under pressure from the
nationalist governor of Tokyo, to purchase the Islands from private Japanese
citizens; (2) the consequent rioting in Mainland China against Japanese
businesses and other symbols of Japanese culture; (3) China’s unilateral
declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the East
China Sea; and (4) the U.S. decision to back Japan in the standoff by flying
two B-52 bombers over China’s newly declared ADIZ.4
1

See, e.g., Martin Fackler, Japan Summons China’s Envoy in Latest Escalation of Tension
over Disputed Islands, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/world/
asia/japan-summons-chinas-envoy-after-ships-near-islands.html?_r=o (describing a meeting
between the Japanese deputy foreign minister and the Chinese Ambassador to Japan during
which the deputy foreign minister admonished China for a recent “incursion” towards the
Islands by Chinese surveillance ships).
2
Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-Yu-Tai (Senkaku) Islands and the
Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 221 (1973) (describing the barren state
of the Islands); Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the T’iaoyutai
Islets (Senkaku Cunto), 15 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L & AFF. 9, 9–10 (1996) (describing
the location, physical characteristics, and economic value of the Diaoyu Islands); Chi
Manjiao, The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over
the Diaoyu Islands, 6 E. ASIA L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2011) (noting that the Islands’ land area is
less than seven square kilometers); Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s Unhelpful
Role in the Senkaku Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 903, 903 (2008); Jonathan Adams, China,
Japan Fishing Boat Standoff Deepens Amid Delayed Talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept.
14, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0914/China-Japan-fishin
g-boat-standoff-deepens-amid-delayed-talks; see also Edward A. Gargan, Man Drowns
During a Protest over Asian Islets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/19
96/09/27/world/man-drowns-during-a-protest-over-asian-islets.html.
3
Frank Ching, Nationalists Making Waves in Japan-China Ties, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 6,
2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/09/06/commentary/nationalists-making-waves
-in-japan-china-ties/#.U1V3koV8PAh.
4
Brian Spegele & Takashi Nakamichi, Anti-Japan Protests Mount in China, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904437202045780000
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The conflict’s recent escalation has coincided with the emergence in 2012
of new Japanese and Chinese governments. The new Chinese President, Xi
Jinping, was speculated to have close ties to leaders in the People’s
Liberation Army even before he came to office.5 This assumption was
seemingly confirmed by the fact that upon leaving the Presidency, Xi’s
predecessor Hu Jintao passed his Chairmanship of the Central Military
Commission to President Xi, thereby investing Xi with more authority upon
taking office than Hu himself initially enjoyed.6 President Xi has further
expanded his authority by establishing a new National Security Council over
which he presides.7 He launched an extensive anti-corruption campaign and
took the unprecedented step of investigating the former domestic security
czar and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang.8 In the
wake of these developments, news reports reflexively label President Xi the
92842756154?mg=reno64-wsj (describing both the Japanese purchase of the Islands and the
riots in China); Thom Shanker, US Sends Two B-52 Bombers Into Air Zone Claimed by China,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/world/asia/us-flies-b-52s-in
to-chinas-expanded-air-defense-zone.html?_r=0 (describing both the Chinese declaration of
the ADIZ and the U.S. response).
5
Tony Capaccio, Gates Says China’s Xi Has Firmer Grip on Army Than Hu Did,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-13/gates-says-ch
ina-s-xi-has-firmer-grip-on-army-than-hu-did.html (quoting former U.S. Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates as saying that “[b]efore, when the Chinese did something aggressive or risky, you
could say that was the PLA acting on their own . . . [n]ow . . . you’ve got to assume President Xi
approved [the ADIZ] and is on board”)’ Jane Perlez, Close Army Ties Of China’s New Leader
Could Test the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/world/as
ia/chinas-xi-jingping-would-be-force-for-us-to-contend-with.html?pagewanted=all (speculating
that Xi’s closeness to the military could result in more aggressive military policies by China).
6
Hu Jintao To Step Down As Military Chief, Making Xi Jinping the Most Powerful, TIMES OF
INDIA (Nov. 12, 2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Hu-Jintao-to-step-downas-military-chief-making-Xi-jinping-the-most-powerfu/articleshow/17190242.cms?referral=PM
(noting that Hu was forced to wait over a year after assuming the Presidency before his
predecessor, Jiang Zemin, relinquished the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission to
him); Jane Perlez, New Chinese Leader Meets Nuclear Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/asia/Chinese-leader-xi-jinping-meets-officers-of-mil
itary-nuclear-unit.html (describing a major meeting between Xi Jinping and the leaders of
China’s nuclear weapons force).
7
Jane Perlez, New Chinese Panel Said to Oversee Domestic Security and Foreign Policy,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/world/asia/national-securit
y-committee-china.html (noting that President Xi’s “position at the helm would serve to
increase his already firm grasp on power”).
8
Michael Forsythe, Chris Buckley & Jonathan Ansfield, Investigating Family’s Wealth,
China’s Leader Signals a Change, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/201
4/04/20/world/asia/severing-a-familys-ties-chinas-president-signals-a-change.html (describing
the anti-corruption drive that has ensnared Zhou Yongkang).
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most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping.9 Ideologically, Mr. Xi
has also asserted himself. In contrast to Mao’s concept of a new nation
beginning in 1949 with the Chinese Revolution, President Xi has pronounced
a nostalgic, nationalistic vision of “China’s ‘great renewal’ and ‘great
rejuvenation,’ [which] requires both looking ahead . . . and reaching back to
well before Mao’s time to an image of China’s earlier greatness, an earlier
China that could be renewed and rejuvenated.”10
Similarly, while Japan has suffered from a leadership deficit in recent
years, Prime Minister Abe has proved far more adept at remaining in power
than his predecessors.11 Meeting some success at the beginning of his term
in ameliorating Japan’s economic problems, Abe has translated his success in
the economic realm into a more assertive foreign policy.12 The emergence of
these two assertive, nationalist leaders suggests that hopes for a prompt
resolution to the Islands dispute are dim.
Despite the increasing international prominence of the conflict and the
potential for military confrontation, some commentary in the U.S. continues
to discount the dispute as either a manufactured political distraction or
irrational irredentism run amok.13 The reality is more nuanced, implicating
9

See, e.g., Jonathan Fenby, Xi Dreams of Shaking Docile China From Its Slumber, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/64b00cfe-c54e-11e3-89a9-00144feabdc
0.html#axzz2zX0ovpEw (“Mr Xi has emerged as the strongest Chinese leader since Deng.”);
China’s Xi Amassing Most Power Since Deng Raises Reform Risk, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 30,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-30/china-s-xi-amassing-most-power-since-de
ng-raises-risk-for-reform.html (“Xi Jinping today completes his first year as China’s leader with
the greatest individual sway over his nation since Deng Xiaoping.”); Reform in China: Every
Move You Make, ECONOMIST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/215898
82-xi-jinping-has-made-himself-most-powerful-leader-deng-xiaoping-probably-good (claiming
that Xi has amassed “more power than any Chinese leader since Deng”).
10
Paul Gewirtz, China’s Search for a Usable Past, CHINAFILE (Jan. 14, 2014), https://
www.chinafile.com/xi-mao-and-chinas-search-usable-past (comparing Xi’s ideas about
Chinese history with those of Mao, who only “selectively emphasized” China’s past and to
whom the Chinese Revolution “self-consciously marked a new beginning, and . . . defined
itself in part in opposition to China’s past”).
11
Gerard Baker & George Nishiyama, Abe Says Japan Ready to Counter China’s Power,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023047994
04579157210861675436 (describing Prime Minister Abe as “one of Japan’s most influential
prime ministers in decades” and noting his desire for a “more active diplomacy for a country
whose global leadership has been crimped by a rapid turnover of weak prime ministers”).
12
Id. (noting that Prime Minister Abe “envisions a resurgent Japan taking a more assertive
leadership role in Asia to counter China’s power” and makes “a direct link between his quest
for a prosperous Japan, and . . . greater influence in the region and the world”).
13
Mure Dickie, Senkaku Spat Reinforces Military Rethink, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/ec105b12-06f1-11e2-92ef-00144feabdco.html; Niall Ferguson, All
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arcane international legal rules, deep-seated popular feelings of national
pride, and geostrategic and economic interests.14
This Note will focus particularly on the applicable international legal
rules in the context of the rules’ interactions with popular nationalism and
state interests. Following this brief introduction, Part II sets forth the
historical background of the islands, and Part III describes the international
law governing the dispute. Part IV analyzes how the applicable international
law interacts with nationalism and state interests to the detriment of a
peaceful solution.
First, this Note argues that international law has failed to attain the goals
of legitimacy and utility because it forces governments to root their
respective claims in historical narratives that implicate painful memories of
past conflicts. Second, this Note suggests alternative legal rules that could
temper the force of popular nationalism and state interests and form the basis
for a sustainable resolution to this conflict. Finally, this Note cautions
against marginalizing the role of international law in this situation and
suggests that reasons for optimism still exist.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Each State’s Historical Links to the Islands
The two sides’ historical links to the Islands, which will be summarized
in turn, are qualitatively different. The following summary is not meant to
be exhaustive of all of the historical claims each side has made to the Islands.
Rather, it is meant to provide a general impression of those claims such that
the interconnection between the parties’ historical claims to the Islands and
their respective nationalist narratives becomes clear.
China’s links to the Islands are purportedly longstanding.15 Some
evidence, contained in Meiji-era Japanese government documents and maps,

the Asian Rage, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/
09/23/niall-ferguson-onhow-china-is-on-the-march-in-asia.html (portraying the Chinese ire at
Japan’s government as irrational and threatening); Stephen Walt, Why doesn’t China just buy
the Senkaku Islands (updated), FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2012/09/21/sell_the_senkakus (indicating that the dispute has a simple and obvious
solution, and failing to mention the fact that substantial economic interests are at stake).
14
David Pilling, Asia-Pacific: Desert Island Risks, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/o/eobc4358-oba5-11e2-b8d8-00144feabdco.html#axzz2fTL3xM5b; RamosMrosovsky, supra note 2, at 917.
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indicates that Japan recognized China as the rightful owner of the Islands
before that time.16 For instance, one of the documents, dating from the
1880s, demonstrates that the Japanese government was hesitant to assert
“national markers” over the Islands at that time for fear of “invit[ing]
Chinese suspicion.”17 Further evidence shows that Chinese officials used the
Islands as navigation aids while traveling to tributary territories.18 Qing
dynasty documents corroborate Chinese claims of historical links to the
Islands. Some of these documents declare that the Islands lay within Chinese
borders. Others describe the ship docking capacity of the Islands.19
Japan explicitly annexed the Islands in 1895 after decisively defeating
China in the first Sino-Japanese War.20 Japan now asserts that China had no
stake in the Islands up to that point and insists that the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, which ended the war and included Chinese cession of lands to
Japan, was never the basis for Japanese sovereignty over the Islands.21
Further, Chinese textbooks once referred to the Islands as Japanese
territory.22 The interim period between the First Sino-Japanese War and
World War II saw sustained economic exploitation of the Islands themselves
by private Japanese citizens.23 The Japanese government, in contrast to these
private actors, seemed unconcerned with the Islands at this time.24
Japan maintained administrative control over the Islands until the end of
World War II. When the San Francisco Treaty of Peace was signed, Japan
agreed to cede sovereignty over territories it conquered through aggressive
15
William B. Heflin, Diayou/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans Apart, 1
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 18:1, 3–4 (June 2000) (describing Chinese historical links to the
Islands going back to 1372).
16
Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behindthe-diaoyusenkaku-islands/?_php=true*_type=blogs&_r=o.
17
Id.
18
UNRYU SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-JAPANESE
RELATIONS 102 (2000).
19
Shaw, supra note 16.
20
Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 2, at 917, 924.
21
Id. at 924.
22
Id. (noting that these textbooks could be found in both the Communist controlled
People’s Republic of China and the Nationalist-controlled Republic of China).
23
Martin Fackler, In Shark-Infested Waters, Resolve of Two Giants Is Tested, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/asia/islands-dispute-tests-resolv
e-of-china-and-japan.html?_r=o (private Japanese citizens built a factory on the largest of the
Islands to make dried bonito shavings, and hunters “gathered albatross feathers for European
fashion boutiques”).
24
Id.
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war.25
In accordance with these post-war arrangements, the U.S.
administered the Islands as part of its administration of the Ryukyu Islands.26
While China considered the entire San Francisco Peace Treaty to be illegal,
the Republic of China (ROC) government, which at the time was
internationally recognized as the legitimate government of China, failed to
object to the U.S.’s administration of the Islands.27
B. A New Dimension to the Dispute: Economic Opportunities Emerge
Neither country seemed overly concerned about the Islands themselves
until the late 1960s when a UN-sponsored economic development group
conducted geographical surveys that concluded that the sea floor surrounding
the Islands could contain “one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in
the world.”28 Two years later under the provisions of the 1971 Okinawa
Reversion Treaty, Japan reassumed administrative control over the Islands in
the face of vociferous protests from both China and the ROC.29
While China and Japan have normalized relations since Japan’s
reassertion of administrative control over the Islands, tension over the Islands
never abated.30 Periodically, private citizens have inserted themselves into
the conflict.31 For instance, Chinese citizens have made abortive attempts to
reach the Islands’ shores before being intercepted by the Japanese Coast

25
Dai Tan, The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute: Bridging the Cold Divide, 5 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 134, 144 (2006).
26
K.T. Chao, East China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Tiao-Yu-T’ai Islands, 2
CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 45, 58 (1982) (emphasizing that the Islands were
administered by the U.S. as part of the administration of the Ryukyu Islands, but conceding
that under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty between Japan and the U.S., the Islands reverted to
Japanese control under the theory that they were part of Okinawa).
27
Han-yi Shaw, Revisiting the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Examining Legal Claims
and New Historical Evidence under International Law and the Traditional East Asian World
Order, 26 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 95, 155 (2008); SUGANUMA, supra note 18, at
125, 153–54 (noting, however, that the ROC stated that its failure to object to the arrangement
should not be construed as acquiescence to Japanese sovereignty over the Islands).
28
SUGANUMA, supra note 18, at 129–31, 153–54.
29
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, The Building of China’s Great Wall at Sea, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 253, 265 (2012).
30
Hungdah Chiu, Selected Recent Foreign Case, Administrative Order and Legal Opinion
Concerning the Republic of China, 5 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 187 (1985).
31
Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 2, at 920.
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Guard.32 On the other side, Japanese citizens have landed on the Islands and
built structures, such as lighthouses, drawing livid reactions from China.33
Japan and China have at times appeared inclined to resolve the dispute—
even as recently as several years ago.34 For example, substantial progress
has been made regarding fishing rights in the disputed areas.35 In 1975, they
concluded a “Fisheries Agreement.”36 In 1997, that agreement was
superseded by a more comprehensive one that established a “Provisional
Measures Zone,” an area wherein the parties would jointly manage fishing
resources.37 Both sides agreed in principle to the idea of a joint development
zone (JDZ). Modeled on a previous arrangement between Japan and South
Korea,38 the agreement would temporarily allow the parties to exploit the
massive resources at stake in conjunction with one another, pending the
outcome of a more comprehensive agreement.39
Since 2010 when Japan arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler
and confiscated his boat after he veered too close to the Islands, the tenor of
the conflict has been decidedly negative.40 The most recent diplomatic spats
resulted from Japan’s planned purchase of the Islands from private Japanese
citizens and the ensuing riots and recriminations against Japanese citizens in
China.41 Recent speculation that China might resort to military retaliation
highlights just how threatening the situation has become.42
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE DISPUTE
A. Territorial Acquisition and International Rules of Sovereignty
Under customary international law, there are five recognized methods of
territorial acquisition: “discovery-occupation, cession, accretion, subjugation

32

Id.
Id. at 920–21.
34
Alexander M. Peterson, Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: A Lasting
Arrangement?, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 441, 473–74 (2009).
35
Michael Sheng-ti Gau, Problems and Practices in Maritime Delimitation in East Asia:
With Special Reference to Taiwan, 4 J. E. ASIAN & INT’L L. 377, 392 (2011).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 391.
39
Id. at 391–94.
40
Pedrozo, supra note 29, at 259–60.
41
Spegele & Nakamichi, supra note 4.
42
Dickie, supra note 13.
33
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(or conquest), and prescription.”43 While three of these methods might apply
in the legal dispute over the Islands, only two are relevant to the present
discussion of how nationalist narratives interact with international law to
frustrate solutions: discovery-occupation and cession.44
In order to demonstrate discovery and occupation effectively a state must
prove that it has satisfied two elements: (1) the intent to occupy (animus
occupandi) and (2) the actual exercise of sovereignty.45 States must
demonstrate the actual existence of sovereignty through evidence of
historical governmental activity concerning the territory.46 In the context of
competing state claims, the customary international law requires that a court
engage in a balancing test to determine the relative degrees of sovereignty
exercised by the respective states.47 Particularly relevant in this case is the
principle sustained by the International Court of Justice regarding “claims to
sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries, ‘very little
in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights . . . might be sufficient in
absence of a competing claim.”48
As to cession, transfer of sovereignty is completed through an agreement
by the grantor-sovereign state and the grantee-state acquiring sovereignty.49
At least according to theory, cession cannot be accomplished through
coercion.50

43

SUGANUMA, supra note 18, at 37.
Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 2, at 913–14, 929 (noting that prescription, whereby a
country obtains sovereignty through a process mirroring adverse possession in the private
property context, might apply in the case of the Islands because of China’s supposed
acquiescence to Japanese claims in the post-WWII period).
45
Id. at 913–14.
46
Id. at 914–15.
47
Id. at 915.
48
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 43 (Oct. 16); see also Note, Thaw in
International Law? Rights in Antarctica Under the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804,
821 (1978) (describing the idea that minimal control over a territory might be legally
sufficient to accord a state sovereignty as nebulous and unworkable).
49
Cheri Attix, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan’s Trading Partners
Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 357, 360 n.19 (1995).
50
Id.
44
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B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Exclusive
Economic Rights
The propriety of each side’s purported territorial acquisition is not the
only relevant international legal issue.51 The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was ratified and came into force in 1994, and
its provisions on seabed rights began to govern the dispute over the Islands
when both China and Japan became parties to it in 1996.52 Under
UNCLOS’s Article 57, whichever country is adjudged to have sovereignty
over the Islands could be entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with
a 200-mile radius extending out from the Islands’ coasts.53 But, the existence
of such an EEZ is not clear in this case, because UNCLOS’s Article 121
provides that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone.”54 The dispute over
whether certain islands constitute “rocks” and whether they can sustain
human habitation or economic life has been vigorously contested, especially
in East Asia.55 Disputes over Article 121 have become, in some cases,
absurd. The Japanese government has gone so far as to assert an exclusive
economic zone surrounding Okinotori, two rocks whose peaks over the
Pacific Ocean at high tide measure a slight 6.3 inches above sea level.56
IV. COMPETING LEGAL CLAIMS AND THE INTERACTION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, NATIONALIST HISTORY, AND STATE ECONOMIC INTERESTS
A. Problems Raised By the Applicable International Law
It’s clear that treaty law and the customary international law of territorial
acquisition are detrimental to a resolution of the dispute.57 Under the

51

Id. at 906.
Peterson, supra note 34, at 444.
53
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
54
Id.
55
See generally Leticia Diaz et al., When is a “Rock” an “Island”?—Another Unilateral
Declaration Defies “Norms” of International Law, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 519 (2007).
56
Id. at 521–23.
57
Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 2, at 934–39 (arguing that international law incentivizes
provocative behavior in the dispute over the Senakakus); id. at 915–16 (describing how “[a]
state failing to protest another’s invasion of its sovereign rights may be deemed to have
acquiesced to a rival’s sovereignty”); Manjiao, supra note 2, at 163; Advertisement, Diaoyu
Islands Belong to China, N.Y. TIMES, at A16–A17 (Sept. 28, 2012) (exemplifying China’s
52
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provisions of UNCLOS, parties may choose from a menu of four possible
dispute resolution mechanisms through written declaration: according to the
Law of the Sea’s Part XV, Section 287, on dispute resolution, if the parties
fail to come to a peaceful agreement, any of the claimants may (1) file the
case with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the
International Court of Justice or (2) they may opt for arbitration according to
the procedures set forth in UNCLOS Annex VII.58 But, even if the parties
were to seek an adjudication of the dispute in a judicial forum, such as the
International Court of Justice or in a quasi-judicial proceeding like
arbitration, whether these decision makers could secure compliance is
uncertain.59 Not only are the conflicting state interests valuable, but the
governments themselves would likely be subject to popular pressure to
disregard the diktat of a foreign body as has occurred in similar contentious
territorial disputes.60 This pressure is especially concerning as international
law and international courts are dependent on perceptions of legitimacy.61
B. The Roots of the Conflict in the Sino-Japanese Wars
The international law of territorial acquisition, as described above, relies
largely on a historical accounting of a state’s official contacts with a
territory. In the case of the Islands, such an inquiry necessarily ties in with
the most emotionally wrought times in modern Chinese and Japanese history.
In analyzing official and unofficial statements by government officials in
both countries, two problems become clear. First, it is impossible for the
governments to make historical arguments as required by international law
without drawing in extremely delicate nationalist sensitivities. Second,
because these nationalist sensitivities are drawn in and are reflected by the
states’ legal positions, international law encourages states to marshal
nationalist passions to shore up their domestic political support rather than to
risk a judicial decision which might undercut that support.
efforts to publicize its legal positions regarding the Senkakus—in this case, by running a fullpage ad in the New York Times).
58
Julie A. Paulson, Melting Ice Causing the Arctic to Boil Over: An Analysis of Possible
Solutions to a Heated Problem, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 349, 365 (2009).
59
Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 2, at 939–40.
60
Achara Ashayagachat, Surapong Wary of Temple Ruling, BANGKOK POST (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://m.bangkokpost.com/topstories/329264 (discussing the International Court of Justice’s
case involving the Preah Vihear Temple dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, and popular
pressure exerted on the Thai government not to comply with any adverse ruling).
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China’s position is, more obviously than the Japanese position, rooted in
a nationalist historical narrative. Hyperbolically, state media in China
routinely trumpets the idea that China has owned the Islands since “ancient
times.”62 To contextualize the place of the Islands within Chinese nationalist
history, China stated its position while reacting to the Okinawa Reversion
treaty:
Back in the Ming dynasty, these islands were already within
China’s sea defence area; they were islands appertaining to
China’s Taiwan . . . fishermen from Taiwan have all along
carried out productive activities on the [D]iaoyu . . . During the
1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese government stole these
islands and in April 1895 it forced the government of the
[Q]ing Dynasty to conclude the unequal ”Treaty of
Shimonoseki” by which “Taiwan together with all islands
appertaining to Taiwan” . . . were ceded. Now, the Sato
government has gone to the length of making the Japanese
invaders’ act of aggression of seizing China’s territory in the
past a ground for claiming that Japan has the so called “title” to
the [D]iaoyu.63
The Foreign Ministry’s blistering statement, delivered with such
conviction, is in reality historically dubious. First, the idea that China
obtained title to any lands appertaining to Taiwan “[b]ack in the Ming
dynasty” touches on a sensitive area for China—especially in light of the
movement for Taiwan’s independence.64 In reality, while successive
Chinese imperial dynasties had links with Taiwan, Taiwan was not a part of
China during the Ming Dynasty.65 Yet, because the Chinese claim to
62
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on Sept. 10, 2012, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.en/eng/xwfw/S2510/2511/1469024.shtml.
63
Zhang Zuxing, A Deconstruction of the Notion of Acquisitive Prescription and Its
Implications for the Diaoyu Islands Dispute, 2 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 323 (2012) (citing to
Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 30, 1971,
[1972] IS Peking Review [Beijing Zhauba] 12).
64
Id. at 334.
65
Tonio Andrade, Taiwan on the Eve of Colonization, in HOW TAIWAN BECAME CHINESE:
DUTCH, SPANISH, AND HAN COLONIZATION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 6, 20–24 (available at
http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/andrade01.html) (demonstrating that Chinese from Fujian
province did have trade links with Taiwan during the Ming dynasty. But, these links were
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sovereignty over the Islands are partially related to its claims regarding
Taiwan, any international adjudication could incidentally injure China’s
claims to Taiwan itself.
Further, even if there were some activities that could be construed as
exercises of sovereignty over Taiwan in the sixteenth century, the existence
of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan clearly does not date back to “ancient”
times.66 Given the aforementioned reluctance on both sides to submit the
Islands dispute to an international forum, the possibility that such an
adjudication could negatively impact China’s claims to Taiwan renders that
route a nonstarter for China.
Further, the Foreign Ministry’s statement raises the specter of the
“unequal” Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in 1895 after Japan routed the Qing
dynasty in the First Sino-Japanese War. The statement’s description of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki as an “unequal treaty” (Chinese: bupingdeng tiaoyue)
recalls the resistance efforts of the nationalist Chinese hero Sun Yat Sen,
who coined the term.67 The concept of “unequal treaties” is interesting in
that when the treaties were signed the concept had no legal definition; China
succeeded in introducing it into the international law discourse.68 In
conjunction with these practical legal efforts, use of the phrase indicates an
effort by China to present Japanese assertions of sovereignty over the Islands
as a direct affront to the nationalist struggles of both Sun and Mao Zedong,
who also used the phrase in his 1920s propaganda.69 Sun described the
cancellation of the “unequal treaties” as essential to his vision of a redeemed
Chinese nation, arguing that under the unequal treaties, Chinese workers had
becomes “slaves of world powers.”70 The rhetoric used in Foreign
Ministry’s statements on the Islands dispute demonstrates the degree to
which its international legal claims coincide with Chinese nationalist
historiography.
inhibited by an imperial ban on foreign trade that existed until 1567. After lifting the ban on
foreign trade, “the Ming still only tolerated overseas adventurism; they did not support it.”).
66
Id. at 26 (pointing to the existence of “two Chinese villages during the earliest years of
Dutch settlement” in Taiwan); Press Release, supra note 62.
67
Dong Wang, The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China, 76 PAC. AFF. 399,
400, 405–06 (2003); id. at 401.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 407; Hu Jintao Claims the Communist Party is Sun Yat-sen’s Most Faithful
Successor, CHINASCOPE (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.chinascope.org/main/content/view/3970/
106 (demonstrating that although Sun was the founder of the ROC, the Chinese Communist
Party has also enthusiastically embraced his legacy).
70
Wang, supra note 67, at 408.
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But while China’s legal claims coincide with its preferred nationalist
ideology, they are complicated by the fact that just over a century ago,
“principles [such] as national independence, national sovereignty, and
national equality, upon which modern international law is built, were
meaningless for the Chinese; they were repugnant to their sense of a
universal state and civilization. The boundaries in the Chinese world order
were strictly cultural . . . .”71 As a result, some argue that to apply the
international law standards of territorial acquisition to China without taking
into account its historical detachment from Western legal traditions would
unjustly prejudice its claims.72 This contention, based on a principle of
fairness, is reflected in the moral outrage of the Foreign Ministry’s
statements.73 Given that intent to occupy is an inalienable element of the
discovery-occupation mode of acquisition, it is difficult to see how a
government could intend to occupy a territory for purposes of international
law when the government’s agents have no concept of delimited territories.74
China should not be exempted from the strictures of international law
simply because its boundaries were considered cultural rather than national.
Nationalism as a political doctrine was not an essential basis of international
law as originally conceived.75 Multi-national empires continued to exist in
Europe itself well into the twentieth century. For instance, the AustroHungarian Empire rejected the idea that “the political and the national unit
should be congruent,” casting doubt on the premise that European
conceptions of international law were inherently dependent on nationalism.76

71
SUGANUMA, supra note 18, at 101 (quoting SAMUEL S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED
NATIONS, AND WORLD ORDER 23 (1979), wherein Kim argues that “principles [such] as
national independence, national sovereignty, and national equality” were the foundations of
modern international law).
72
Id.
73
See generally Press Release, supra note 62.
74
Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 2, at 914.
75
ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY
14–19 (1990) (arguing that the present definition of a nation differs markedly from those that
appeared several hundred years ago, when national populations were distinguished solely by
their locations within the borders of a state rather than any other criteria such as language,
religion, etc.).
76
Stephen Schwartz, Modern Islam and Democracy, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 375, 379–80
(2008) (quoting an Austro-Hungarian politician, Karl Renner, as saying that “[n]ations should
organize, not according to territorial units but as associations of persons, not as States but as
peoples”); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1 (1983).
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Rather, the international law system has depended on the concept of state
sovereignty that has existed at least since the Peace of Westphalia.77 The
truer reason for the moral outrage imbuing the Foreign Ministry’s statement
is that its past governments lacked the power, if not the will or intent, to
exercise control over its far-flung territories, and that the memory of this
failure is a primary driver of Chinese nationalism. The period from 1839, the
date of the First Opium War, and 1949, the culmination of the Chinese
Revolution, has been popularly dubbed the “Century of Humiliation.”78
About a decade prior to the American Civil War, China played host to an
exponentially more devastating civil conflict: the Taiping Rebellion.79 A
heterodox Christian named Hong Xiuquan led a rebellion against the Qing
dynasty.80 Contemporary estimates are that approximately twenty million
people were killed in the strife.81 The Qing government was defeated twice
by powers seeking to impose their access to and control over Chinese ports
by force.82 Japan subsequently defeated the Qing dynasty.83 Further, the
Chinese government lost effective control of the Boxer Rebellion in the late
nineteenth century, and a “general breakdown in public order” followed.84
After the 1911 Nationalist Revolution, China became what some claimed
to be the first true republic on the Asian continent.85 However, that
revolution did not mark the emergence of a powerful Chinese state. The

77

Marcílio Toscano Franca Filho, Westphalia: A Paradigm? A Dialogue between Law, Art,
and Philosophy of Science, 8 GER. L.J. 955, 955 (2007) (describing the widespread notion of
the Westphalian system as one “representing the beginning of modern international society
established in a system of states” and instilling a strong respect for state sovereignty in
international law).
78
Alison Adcock Kaufman, The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese
Perceptions of the International Order, 25 PAC. FOCUS 1, 1–2 (2010).
79
John Newsinger, The Taiping Peasant Revolt, 82 MONTHLY REV.: AN INDEP. SOCIALIST
MAG. 29, 29–30 (2000).
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Orville Schell, Unheavenly Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/02/04/books/unheavenly-kingcom.html (reviewing JONATHAN D. SPENCE, GOD’S CHINESE
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Chiang Kai-Shek, The First Asian Republic, 28 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 34 (Nov. 1,
1961) (claiming the distinction of the First Asian Republic for the ROC after it was forcibly
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period after the Revolution, from 1916 through 1928, has been labeled the
“warlord period,” aptly describing the disorganization of the state.86
Japan’s stated position on the Islands is equally dogmatic, but its
statements are not marked by the same moral outrage. Japan has insisted that
no territorial dispute over the Islands exists.87 More specifically, Japan
argues that the Islands were unclaimed territory, or terra nullius, until 1895
and subject to acquisition by discovery and occupation.88 Japan adamantly
asserts that its acquisition of the Islands was entirely separate from the
Treaty of Shimonoseki that concluded the first Sino-Japanese War.89 In light
of the evidence outlined by Han-Yi Shaw, it is arguable that the Japanese
acquisition actually occurred through a coerced cession, which, as discussed
above, would make it void under the San Francisco Treaty of Peace.90 The
Japanese position attempts to skirt rather than directly confront the role that
Japanese militarism played in Japan’s acquisition of the Islands. In other
words, Japan’s position is that some of its territorial expansion in the late
nineteenth century was legitimate rather than aggressive. This position
preserves both a legitimate historical legacy for Japan’s imperial period as
well as legitimate title to certain lands that otherwise should have reverted to
China and other countries under the San Francisco Treaty of Peace.91
The Japanese political system has been dominated in the decades since
World War II by a pacifist approach to foreign policy, an attitude embedded
in the post-war Constitution.92 This attitude has coexisted uneasily with
Japan’s growth into an international economic power, and many Japanese
86

Zhongping Chen, The May Fourth Movement and Provincial Warlords: A Reexamination,
37 MOD. CHINA 135, 136 (2011) (questioning the traditional dichotomy between popular
nationalism and anti-warlordism and arguing that in some cases warlords promoted popular
nationalism).
87
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Goes Unheeded, REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/
28/us-china-japan-usa-idUSBRE88Q1ZL20120928.
88
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Id. at 924.
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Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in
International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2000) (stating that
many believe the Islands to have been part of Taiwan at the time of the 1895 Treaty of
Shimonseki, at which point Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and that if it were, the Islands should
have returned to Chinese sovereignty along with all others returned under the San Francisco
Treaty of Peace).
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Heflin, supra note 15, at 6–7 (describing Japan’s preferred narrative of its acquisition of
the Islands through discovery and occupation).
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Hudson Hamilton, Emergence of the Right to Live in Peace in Japan, 12 AUSTRALIAN J.
ASIAN L. 35, 35 (2010).
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politicians advocate the idea that Japan should abandon its solely defensive
military posture in order to become a “normal” country.93 The ruling Liberal
Democratic Party of Japan has proposed revising the Constitution so as to
increase the role of the Emperor and to provide the Self-Defense Forces with
a new name (National Defense Army) and wider latitude.94
Related to their desire to make Japan a “normal” country, Japanese
nationalists aim to redeem the Japanese government’s conduct from the late
nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. This goal has been
symbolically demonstrated by nationalist Japanese officials’ decisions to
visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan’s war dead—
especially those from the wars with China and the U.S.—and includes
convicted war criminals.95 Each such visit inevitably raises the hackles of
China, but China’s reactions have been particularly heated in the present
context of heightened tensions over the Islands.96
Japan’s self-appointed citizen-defenders of the Islands appear to have
similarly retrospective attitudes: for example, on one relatively recent
voyage, Japanese nationalists from the “Association to Protect Our
Children’s Future From Chinese Intimidation” attempted to land on the
Islands before being stopped.97 The organization’s name, while sounding
somewhat belligerent itself, does at least convey an attitude concerned more
with the future than the past. Its actions, though, appeared equally geared
toward the past: before the nationalists abandoned their mission to the
Islands under pressure from the Japanese Coast Guard, their flag-bearer
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turned toward the coast guard sailors and “crisply saluted in the style of
Japan’s prewar military.”98
These analyses demonstrate that the international law of territorial
acquisition undermines the goal of peacefully adjudicating international
territorial disputes. It does so by requiring parties to construct and rely on
nationalistic historical narratives and by providing a framework to decide
which state’s nationalist myth is more sympathetic. In the past, international
legal bodies have emphasized the claimants’ respective assertions of
sovereignty over territory, attempting to draw sharp distinctions between
legal claims based on “irredentist history and ancient documents” and those
based on direct evidence.99 In the case of the Islands, while the evidence of
governmental control on both sides might be weak, not all of it descends to
the level of “indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ages”
that have been rejected by the International Court of Justice in the past.100
Additionally, any resolution to the dispute over the Islands would require the
Court to make sweeping judgments about the past two centuries of Chinese
history and Japanese history and their relation to international law. That the
parties would engage in nationalistic pandering is unsurprising, and
international law has not truly given the parties an incentive to back away
from “irredentist” history. As has been demonstrated above, the Islands are
currently uninhabited and both states have scant evidence of involvement
with them. Yet, despite the weakness of the respective claims in absolute
terms, international law encourages the sides to ground their claims in
historical narratives that evoke powerful emotions among their citizens.
Instead of setting the ground for an equitable solution to the dispute,
international law renders the dispute insoluble.
V. ALTERNATIVE RULES THAT MIGHT PROVIDE MORE STABLE GROUNDS
FOR RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE
The UNCLOS provision distinguishing “rocks” from “islands” has been a
bone of contention since the treaty’s inception.101 The parties to the treaty
98
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100
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France’s legal argument that a thirteenth century war could have any bearing on its territorial
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101
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UNCLOS fails to define the “economic life” and “human habitation” that must be sustained
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were especially concerned with the idea that insignificant “protuberances”
would grant states grounds to claim massive economic resources.102 The
final language was, as discussed above, particularly vague.103
Because territorial disputes do not remain static and new problems
constantly arise involving UNCLOS, it is worth exploring how alternative
rules could help guide a solution to the dispute. Further driving the need for
a new set of rules is the fact that the current formulation seems ripe for
manipulation.
Even, for instance, if a court were to clarify that territories unable to
sustain habitation and economic life of their own are automatically deemed
rocks, that might not preclude a state from introducing manmade
innovations, such as desalination plants, that would make habitation and
human life sustainable even though only introduced for purposes of
manipulating the rule.104 Presumably, increasing technological advancement
will make artificial enhancement of islands that have historically been
practically unsustainable more feasible.
On the other hand, if the rule were interpreted differently, and states were
precluded from exercising territorial sovereignty over islands simply because
they could not sustain habitation and economic life on their own, that might
present other problems. An island twenty-five miles off of the coast (outside
of both the territorial sea and the so-called “contiguous zone”) that had
traditionally been sustained by trade with the mainland might be excluded
from the UNCLOS definition.105 The gaps in the treaty language therefore
have major implications for both states.
Outrage in reaction to blatant manipulations of the UNCLOS rules must
be tempered by the fact that parties entered the Convention with clear eyes
and probably did not expect that they were sacrificing any rights they

on a territory to distinguish it as an island and also that it fails to indicate whether such
habitation or economic life must be viable independent of outside support).
102
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Id.
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and Korea, 15 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2 (2011) (discussing the possibility of installing desalination
plants on islands in order to satisfy the requirements of UNCLOS). See also Paulson, supra
note 58, at 349–50 (stating that technological changes are not the only factors that threaten to
drown the rules set forth in UNCLOS and pointing to environmental changes, such as the
melting of the arctic ice caps and the ensuing drive by states to access newly accessible energy
resources under the melted caps, as major threats to UNCLOS).
105
Carol Elizabeth Remy, U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and International
Environmental Protection, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1208, 1221–22 (1992–1993).
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previously claimed. Had the provisions been any more specific, the parties
might have backed out of the treaty for fear of waiving their claims to the
Islands. Therefore, deliberate vagueness could be seen to bolster the
legitimacy of the rules in the eyes of governments and their peoples at the
outset—at least before any adjudication is made in reliance upon them.
However, the vagueness of the rules and the understanding that neither state
would have consented to the treaty knowing that it impinged on their claims
would render any international decision on the matter somewhat arbitrary.
Such a decision would lack legitimacy, and without willingness from either
state to submit the dispute to an international forum, the rules are deprived of
utility and can serve only to inflame nationalist anger.
The failure of the international law in the dispute, wrought by its
imprecision and sensitivity to manipulation, might drive international actors
devising and revising treaties to embrace much more specific rules that
would more explicitly set forth the tests of sovereignty and the conditions for
establishing EEZs. Doing so might provide greater clarity in resolving
disputes.
Here again, however, the more specific the rules the less likely that states
with disputes will ratify them if they fear that their interests could be
negatively impacted. For example, if the UN proposed a rule whereby a
certain number of inhabitants must continuously occupy the island or if the
current rule were more specifically interpreted such that independent
economic sustainability were required in order to establish an EEZ, then the
more likely that a negatively impacted state would view the rule as
illegitimate and reject it. Just because general rules might seem illegitimate
due to their vagueness, they might seem equally illegitimate for their
arbitrariness in the case of the UN’s proposal or their anti-democratic nature
(if an international tribunal such as the International Court of Justice were to
develop a more specific reading of the current rule).
Other problems are associated with the laws of territorial acquisition.
While the rules might seem reasonable in most contexts, the absolute quality
of the sovereignty that they accord in the context of UNCLOS can, as has
been mentioned, produce ridiculous claims.106 The possibility that states
could attempt to manipulate the UNCLOS definitions is no idle concern.107
The aforementioned Okinotori Island (meaning “remote bird island,” which
106
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gives some indication of its capacity for human habitation) has been the
subject of continuous protection and enhancement by Japan.108 For instance,
Japan has taken pains to “plant extra coral around [the Islands] in an attempt
to beef them up and protect them from erosion.”109 Tokyo has backed up its
claim with money: $600 million has been spent on “encasing parts of the
islets in concrete and steel” in hopes of keeping them from disappearing
permanently—rather than just at high tide.110
Further, even if the rules are deemed to be legitimate by states and their
populations on the principle of state assent, that does not mean that states or
their citizens will deem an international tribunal or an arbitration panel’s
interpretations of those rules to be legitimate. A disconnect exists between
the legitimacy of international law and organizations in the abstract, where
legitimacy is often inferred theoretically through factors such as “formality,
determinacy, [and] assent.”111 The enforcement of international law can be
popularly viewed as illegitimate for the simple reason that it counters the
accepted nationalist narrative.112 Optimally, an alternative rule would
promote state and popular assent both to international rules and to
international tribunals enforcing them.
All of this commentary is to indicate that while it is quite necessary to
criticize the current UNCLOS rules and to analyze their negative impacts,
developing an alternative, even for prospective application only, is not a
simple proposition with ready-made prescriptions. However, there can be a
balance between the sometimes conflicting qualities of specificity and
vagueness, on the one hand, and legitimacy and utility on the other.
Finally, the overriding concern in the case of the dispute over the Islands
is to fashion rules that tamp down nationalist prejudices and provides the
underpinnings for a settlement to which both parties would be amenable.
The primary goal of the proposed rules is, therefore, to remove the dispute,
108
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in any way possible. The proposed rules below attempt to mitigate
unnecessary emotional sources of conflict between the parties and to redirect
the focus of conflict from retrospective angst towards the original crux of the
dispute: economics.
None of the rules that follow are intended to be exclusive of one another.
Instead, they provide a framework that could work together to provide states
with more incentives to compromise.
A. Exclusive Economic Zones: Flexibility over Brittleness
This section explores how to craft a rule that is at once specific,
legitimate, and flexible. Therefore, in the case of UNCLOS’s Article 57 that
provides for the 200-mile EEZ, the UNCLOS parties might propose
changing the rule so that where islands have either sporadic or non-existent
human populations, territorial sovereignty is only one factor of several in
determining where maritime boundaries are drawn. Because resources are at
stake, the rules could take into account the practical need each respective
population has for those resources. Japan, for instance, is known to be
energy starved.113 Its citizens also use far more energy per-capita than
China’s.114 These could be factors militating in its favor. On the other hand,
China’s much larger population and accelerated economic growth, both of
which demand greater access to resources, might count in its favor.115
Further, instead of the historical evidence of each states’ respective
involvement with the Islands themselves, whose inherent geographical
virtues are admittedly not at the heart of the dispute, the rules might include
as a factor the states’ historical uses of the sea-lanes above which the
resources are to be found. Even though China famously prohibited foreign
trade after the remarkable expeditions of Zheng He in the early 1400s, the
evidence recounted above indicates that China continued to maintain oceangoing vessels for more local maritime voyages.116 By inquiring as to each
113
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states’ use of the sea-lanes surrounding the Islands rather than solely relying
on their assertions of sovereignty over the territory, the rule would provide a
more practical basis for sea-bed exploitation rights. Such a rule would
inherently provide a tribunal or arbitral panel with more evidence with which
to impose an equitable solution, because any evidence of sea-lane use would
necessarily be combined with evidence of use of the territory. The current
rule, whereby the Court can only weigh the very scant evidence relating to
contacts with the territory in deciding the relative merits of each states’
involvement with the territory itself is more speculative. As discussed
above, this rule is inflammatory. Including sea-lane use as a factor might at
least dampen the recent nationalist excesses. Use of the sea in itself is not
linked to any of the sensitive topics discussed above—the unequal treaties,
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the First Sino-Japanese War, or the link that
China has made between its rights to Taiwan and its rights to the Islands.
B. Minimal Contacts Baseline and Binding Arbitration
In cases such as this, where both governments have limited, at best,
historical contact with the disputed Islands, UNCLOS could be amended to
provide that neither party’s claim to exclusive sovereignty will be recognized
unless the parties submit the dispute to binding arbitration. This alternative
is much preferred to allowing a court or arbitral panel to come up with an
essentially arbitrary reading of the terms “rocks,” “islands,” “economic life,”
and “habitation.” Instead, the treaty should expand on the work already done
by the parties in negotiations. For instance, it might mandate that where
reasonable readings of the UNCLOS provisions do not require a tribunal to
conclude that one party should prevail, the parties must choose one of three
courses: negotiate between themselves a Joint Development Zone, submit
themselves to binding arbitration such that an arbitral panel can develop an
equitable solution, or have the International Court of Justice or the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea perform a similar function in
fashioning an equitable solution.
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that any rule will have legitimacy if it grants
full sovereignty over the seabed rights to either party. Both parties have
demonstrated contacts with the Islands, but neither side’s argument is

India, Africa, and Arabia, and the subsequent ban by the Ming Dynasty of all foreign trade);
SUGANUMA, supra note 18 (describing Chinese use of the Islands during the Qing Dynasty as
navigational markers in their journeys to the tributary Ryukyu Islands).
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decisive. Both governments are constrained by their domestic publics, and,
as a result, neither can submit to international adjudication because of the
risk that they will lose and incur either international isolation for
disregarding the ruling or domestic antipathy for complying. The situation is
one in which international law should provide a stabilizing basis for the
parties to negotiate, but instead it complicates them.
C. The “Condominium” Alternative
Condominium is defined in public international law as a situation wherein
two states “exercise joint sovereignty over a territory.”117 The condominium
concept has firm roots in history, stretching back to feudal and even Roman
times.118 Many international law scholars, however, have rejected the
condominium concept as antiquated and incompatible with the modern state
sovereignty system.119
However, in a dispute such as this, where neither party has substantial
historical connections to the territory itself and all negotiations between the
parties have envisioned the joint exploitation of resources as a conceptual
solution, the condominium has potential application.120 Therefore, in the
interest of prompting adversary states to negotiate and settle their
differences, the UNCLOS might be amended to require that, in cases such as
this, that there be certain baselines without which absolute sovereignty
cannot be exercised. The absence of any population could serve as such a
baseline. Alternatively, the construction of substantial permanent structures
on the territory could be another. At some point, UNCLOS could require
that in the event of conflicting territorial claims, and absent sufficient
historical contacts with the territory, sovereignty over surrounding seas can
only be asserted through a condominium arrangement in the absence of a
negotiated solution. Currently, UNCLOS only allows for sovereignty over

117

See generally Joel H. Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in International Practice:
Reviving an Abandoned Concept of Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 727,
728 (2008) (providing historical and contemporary examples of condominium arrangements
in international law, rebutting criticisms of the practice, and suggesting that such
arrangements provide for more durable solutions to boundary disputes than alternative
arrangements).
118
Id. at 730–31.
119
Id.
120
Sheng-ti Gau, supra note 35, at 393–94.
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the seas as an extension of full territorial sovereignty.121 Under such a
revised rule, by contrast, the states’ rights would depend on their maritime
boundaries notwithstanding the Islands. Therefore, the Chinese claims
would extend from either the mainland or Taiwan, and the Japanese claims
would extend from the Ryukyu Islands.
Some scholars validly point out that ensuring cooperation in a
condominium can be problematic.122 Obviously, it would be difficult for
parties to a territorial dispute to adhere to the mandate of an international
court that requires them to cooperate in administering a territory. However,
the condominium could be presented as an option for states seeking
compromise. States rejecting this option could instead be incentivized to
delineate a compromise maritime boundary by the flexible EEZ rules
outlined in the previous section. Samuels argued that the presence of a
population that must abide by laws jointly conceived by the two states
complicates the possibility of a condominium, but that problem does not
exist here because the Islands are not inhabited.123
Given the parties’ previous assent to a Joint Development Zone, the
possibility of a condominium arrangement might not be so far-fetched.
A condominium arrangement has only been imposed by the International
Court of Justice once, in the Gulf of Fonseca case.124 But, Antarctica has
been viewed, at least by claimant states, as a potential site of a condominium
for the purposes of resource exploitation.125 Currently, Antarctica is
governed jointly by the international community and states are banned from
asserting national claims.126 Except for the fact that these non-claimant
121

Christina A. Hoefsmit, Southern Ocean Shakeup: Establishing Sovereignty In Antarctica
and the Consequences For Fishery Management, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 547, 548
(2010).
122
Samuels, supra note 117, at 730 (noting the critics of condominiums who insist that if
states cannot come to an amicable resolution in the first place, they probably cannot cooperate
in the daily administration of a territory under a condominium).
123
Id. at 776 (noting that condominia have been most successful in cases where the
territories at issue contained small populations).
124
Faraz Sanei, The Caspian Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the Prospects For
Iran’s Isolation From the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran’s Legal Options With Its
Political Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 681, 802–03 (2001).
125
Allan Young, Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law Of the Sea: A Question of
Compromise, 11 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 45, 52 (1985) (describing how the U.S. proposed a
condominium arrangement in Antarctica among claimant states and how this proposal was
rejected by non-claimant states that nevertheless wanted to participate in administering
Antarctica).
126
Samuels, supra note 117, at 767.
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states have interests in Antarctica, it would appear to be a similar situation to
the Islands. The continent is uninhabited, several states have had minimal
contact with it throughout history, and it is thought to have the potential for
vast resources.127 If a condominium has been considered in the case of
Antarctica, there is no reason not to consider it in the case of the Islands.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, a superficial application of international relations theory
might tempt us to believe that the parties’ relentless pursuits of objective
national interests will determine the course of the conflict. The questions of
international law explored above, which have not even been directly applied
to the dispute in any judicial process, could easily be seen only as windowdressing for a hardnosed showdown between two states desperate to tap a sea
of vast economic resources. This Note has demonstrated not only that
international interests are equally matched by domestic political concerns in
both countries, but also that the applicable international law frames the
domestic political discourse in a destructive way.
While acknowledging that the dispute is extremely volatile and prone to
escalation at any moment, reason to hope for a peaceful resolution persists.
However, in order to create the conditions necessary for such a resolution,
the plane of conflict needs to be shifted: the parties must be unfettered
insofar as possible from their past nationalist animosities and instead coaxed
into concentrating on the future economic opportunities presented by the
East China Sea. Heretofore, the applicable international law has shackled the
parties to the stale narratives of the past.
Undoubtedly, nationalist provocateurs on both sides are also culprits.
But, nationalist fervor has been fitful, and past negotiations (such as those in
2007, when the concept of a Joint Development Zone was agreed to) have
demonstrated that when such emotions have subsided, the parties have found
broad areas for agreement that belie their strident public declarations. While
the current, tense situation might appear to fit squarely in the arenas of
domestic politics and international geopolitics rather than international law,
this Note has attempted to demonstrate how those factors coincide to the
detriment of a peaceful solution. Hopefully, international rules can be
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Colin C. Diehl, Antarctica: An International Laboratory, 18 BC ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
423, 427 (1991) (describing the potential mineral wealth of Antarctica); Young, supra note
125, at 69 n.114 (describing the continent not only as uninhabited, but uninhabitable).

2014]

THE PACIFIC WAR, CONTINUED

613

implemented which will complement each other and prove conducive to a
mutually agreeable solution.

